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EXTRAORDINARY GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION TO BOLSTER BANK BALANCE
SHEETS
LISSA L. BROOME*
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis has brought many banks, both large and
small, to their knees. In 2008, twenty-five banks failed,' more than
in any year since 1993. Moreover, one of those failed banks -
Washington Mutual (WaMu) - was the largest bank failure in
• 2
history. Three of the four largest U.S. banking institutions were
so at risk that one - Wachovia - was acquired by Wells Fargo, a
smaller institution,' and two - Citigroup and Bank of America -
were forced to request government investments in excess of the
initial government investments they received under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP).4 The aggressive responses to the
crisis by Congress, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors (FRB), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) to help banks improve their capital positions
and liquidity have dramatically altered the liability and equity
* Wachovia Professor of Banking Law; Director, Center for Banking and Finance,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. Thanks to Eamonn K.
Moran, Research Associate, Center for Banking and Finance for valuable research
assistance.
1. Joe Adler, Two More Failures Brings 2008 Tally to 25, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15,
2008, at 16. See also FDIC, Bank Failures & Assistance, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/bank/2008/index.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
2. The WaMu failure was resolved at no cost to the FDIC, however, as J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. purchased its banking operations for $1.9 billion. Joe Adler,
Success with Failures, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 2008, at 1.
3. As of June 30, 2008, Wachovia's assets stood at $812.4 billion, thirty-three
percent larger than Wells Fargo's $609 billion in assets. Bank and Thrift Holding
Companies with the Most Assets on June 30, 2008, AM. BANKER, Jan. 15, 2009.
4. Citigroup and Bank of America each received additional TARP funds
beyond that in the initial Capital Purchase Program. The government's investment in
preferred stock in each institution now stands at $45 billion. See infra text
accompanying notes 26-31.
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sides of bank balance sheets. In 2009, it is likely that government
purchases and guarantees of bank assets will increasingly be used
to assist particular institutions and foster financial market
stability This unprecedented government assistance to prevent
widespread bank failure and to provide support for those
institutions "too big to fail" underscores the vital role that banks
play in our economy. This Comment explores these actions and
discusses some of their implications.
II. GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN BANKS - PREFERRED STOCK
AND WARRANTS FOR COMMON STOCK
Congress' initial legislative response to the financial crisis,
but not likely to be its last, was the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), enacted on October 3, 2008.
The $700 billion in funds authorized by Congress in EESA to assist
in the financial crisis clean-up, labeled "Troubled Asset
Repurchase Program" (TARP), were quickly diverted by Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson from buying troubled mortgage-related
assets held by banks to purchasing preferred, non-voting stock in
banks under what is called the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). 6
A second bank investment program, the Targeted Investment
Program (TIP), was announced on November 23, 2008, and has
been used to fund additional preferred stock investments in
Citigroup and Bank of America beyond the initial CPP
investments.
The first tranche of funds released by Congress for the
TARP amounted to $250 billion, and all of it has been committed
for CPP and TIP preferred stock purchases, although as of the
beginning of 2009, only $187.5 billion had actually been disbursed.7
5. See Emily Flitter, Giving B of A More Help, Did Government Tip Hand? AM.
BANKER, Jan. 20, 2009, at 1. See infra text accompanying notes 26 and 29.
6. See Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept., Treasury Announces TARP Capital
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp
1207.htm [hereinafter TARP Capital Purchase Program Description].
7. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., FOURTH TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (Jan. 7, 2009),
available at http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/Fourth-Tranche-Report.pdf.
Disbursement of the remaining allocated funds is subject to approval of capital
applications by bank regulators, shareholder approval in some cases, and other
closing procedures. Id. at 4-5. See Mike Ferullo, Treasury Financing: Treasury
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Secretary Paulson deemed the CPP a more expeditious way to
inject capital into the banking system than attempting to value and
purchase troubled mortgage-related assets held by banks. Paulson
originally strongly resisted government stock purchases, calling
taking preferred stock in banks "what you do when you have
failure" and stating "[t]his is about success."8 His opposition to
government stock purchases was in stark contrast with the lead of
other countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
Spain, and Italy. But, he soon did an about face, announcing the
CPP on October 14, 2008.9
The Treasury Secretary's authority under EESA to use the
so-called "bailout" funds to buy preferred stock is somewhat
convoluted. The Secretary is authorized by EESA to "purchase,
and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets
from any financial institution. '"1' "Troubled assets" are defined to
Disclosed $15 Billion in Funds to Banks Under Capital Purchase Program, 92 BNA
BANKING REP. 131 (Jan. 20, 2009). The amount of preferred stock that the
government purchased in any one institution could not be less than one percent of
the institution's risk-weighted assets, and not more than the lesser of $25 billion or
three percent of risk-weighted assets. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS,
CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM 1-2 (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/
initiatives/eesa/program-descriptions/cpp.shtml (hereafter "Program Description").
JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America (following the
consummation of its merger with Merrill Lynch) each received the maximum
investment of $25 billion. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., APPENDIX 1, FOURTH TRANCHE
REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/
eesa/docs/Fourth-Tranche-Report-Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Fourth Tranche
Appendix].
Such widespread government ownership of bank stock is not without precedent. The
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, established in 1932, bought stock in 6,000
banks at a cost of $1.3 billion, which would be approximately $200 billion in today's
dollars, and the government about broke even on the subsequent sale of bank stock
to investors or back to the banks. More recently, in 1984, the United States took an
eighty percent ownership stake in Continental Illinois National Bank, at the time the
country's seventh largest bank. See Steve Lohr, Intervention is Bold, but Has a Basis
in History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at Al.
8. Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, White House Overhauling Rescue
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/
12/business/12imf.html (quoting testimony before the United States Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and, Urban Affairs on September 23, 2008).
9. Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept., Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal
Reserve and FDIC (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl206.htm.
See also supra note 5.
10. H.R. REP. No. 110-1424, § 101(a)(1) (2008). "Financial institution" is defined
as "any institution, including, but not limited to, any bank, savings association, credit
union, security broker or dealer or insurance company . . . having significant
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include the types of assets that most observers anticipated would
be purchased - "residential or commercial mortgages and any
securities, obligations, or other instruments, that are based on or
related to such mortgages,"'" as well as "any other financial
instrument that the [Treasury] Secretary, after consultation with
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote
financial market stability."12
The term "financial instrument" is not, however, defined in
the statute. A colloquy on the floor of the House of
Representatives prior to the House vote in favor of EESA
addressed the scope of the term. Representative Barney Frank,
Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, confirmed
that the scope of the assets that the government may purchase "is
intended to include capital instruments of an institution such as
common and preferred stock, subordinated and senior debt, and
equity rights."' 3 Frank noted that the "authority to buy equity"
was added to EESA by the House and the Senate, and that the
purpose of the expenditures "is not simply buying up the assets, it
is to buy equity, and to buy equity in a way that the Federal
Government will be able to benefit if there is an appreciation,'
14
and "to enable financial institutions to begin providing credit
again." Representative Moran added that, if done effectively,
equity infusions have the capacity to provide between ten and
• 16
twelve times the amount of the initial government investment.
As the CPP program was originally conceived, there were
no specific requirements regarding how banks that received the
government equity infusion should use it. 7 The statute did require
operations in the United States, but excluding any central bank of, or institution
owned by, a foreign government." Id. § 3(5).
11. Id. § 3(9)(A).
12. Id. § 3(9)(B).
13. 154 CONG. REC. 10763 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008) (statement of Rep. Frank)
(emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 154 CONG. REC. 10796 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008) (statement of Rep. Moran).
17. The expectation by Treasury officials and perhaps Congress seems to be that
banks would use the additional capital to increase lending, when in fact much of it
appears to have been used to shore up capital positions and, at least in one case,
[Vol. 13
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that certain executive compensation arrangements for CPP
recipients would be limited." In addition, banks receiving the
investment money were required to sign a contract providing that
the Treasury "may unilaterally amend any provision ... to the
extent required to comply with any changes after the Signing Date
in applicable federal statutes."' 9 Some banks cited this open-ended
commitment as the reason they either elected not to apply for
TARP money or have yet to decide whether to accept it.2° Political
leaders have since called for additional accountability by banks
regarding the use of these funds.21
Institutions accepting preferred stock investments by the
United States also are required to pay quarterly dividends to the
United States of five percent per year for the first five years of the
22investment and nine percent per year thereafter. The institution
may repurchase the preferred stock three years after its issuance
for the purchase price plus accrued and unpaid dividends.2 ' The
government also receives warrants to buy common stock at a
market price equal to fifteen percent of the preferred stock
24investment. The exercise price for the warrants is the common
25
stock price on the date of the investment
On November 23, 2008, the Treasury Department, FRB,
26
and FDIC announced further actions to support Citigroup. This
finance an acquisition of an institution that did not have its request for TARP funds
honored. See Joe Adler, Success with Failures, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 2008, at 1
(discussing PNC's purchase of Nat City after Treasury declined to provide TARP
funds to Nat City as a stand-alone entity).
18. See U.S. Treas. Dept., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Executive
Compensation, http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/executivecompensation.shtml
(last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
19. Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept., Securities Purchase Agreement, Standard
Terms (Oct. 31, 2008) at 35, http://www.treas.gov/pres/releases/reports/spa.pdf.
20. See Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Approved for Infusions - But Hesitant, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 8, 2009, at 1.
21. See Stacy Karper, House Debate Conditions for Rest of Tarp Funds, AM.
BANKER, JAN. 14,2009, at 3.
22. See TARP Capital Purchase Program Description, supra note 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (the market price at investment is to be calculated on a 20-trading day
trailing average).
26. Press Release, FDIC, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and
FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/208/pr08
125.html.
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new effort included an additional $20 billion investment in
Citigroup preferred stock carrying an eight percent dividend, as
opposed to the five percent dividend due to the Treasury during
the first five years on its initial $25 billion equity infusion.27
Pursuant to this second extraordinary infusion of equity, the
Treasury imposed some additional conditions. First, dividends on
common stock are limited to one cent per share per quarter for
three years unless the Treasury consents to additional dividend
28payments. Second, there are additional restrictions on executive
compensation, and third, Citigroup must adopt the FDIC's
mortgage modification procedures developed in the
conservatorship of IndyMac. Bank of America received a similar
package of benefits, including another $20 billion preferred stock
investment, on January 16, 2009.29 These additional equity
investments in Citigroup and Bank of America were pursuant to a
new TARP program labeled the Targeted Investment Program
(TIP), rather than the CPP. 0 The purpose of TIP is to "foster
market stability and thereby to strengthen the economy and
protect American jobs, savings, and retirement security."'"
III. GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES OF BANK DEBT, INCLUDING
INCREASED DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The largest source of funds for most banks is customer
deposits. Deposits are liabilities of banks, and most deposits must
be repaid to customers on demand. Banks may also raise funds by
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Press Release, FDIC, Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC Provide
Assistance to Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009), http://fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/
pr09004.html.
30. There are currently two other TARP programs in addition to the CPP and
TIP. One, for Systemically Significant Failing Institutions, was used to provide $40
billion to AIG in exchange for preferred stock and warrants. See Fourth Tranche
Appendix, supra note 7. The second, announced in December 2009, is the
Automotive Industry Financing Program in which $19.4 billion (and an additional $4
billion subject to certain conditions) has been committed to GMAC, GM, and
Chrysler. Id.
31. Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept,, Treasury Releases Guidelines for Targeted
Investment Program (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1338.htm
(listing five eligibility considerations that Treasury may consider in providing
additional capital under this program).
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borrowing from other creditors. Congress and the FDIC increased
the deposit insurance guarantee, and the FDIC has provided
guarantees to other bank creditors in an effort to make lending to
banks more attractive to lenders and less costly for banks.
EESA increased the deposit insurance amount from
$100,000 to $250,000 until December 31, 2009, in order to further
depositor confidence in banks and quell the destructive effect of
bank runs." Runs by creditors are a phenomenon unique to
banks. The claim of bank depositors, unlike the claim of the
creditors of other businesses, is due on demand and at par. In
contrast, bondholders of General Motors (GM), for example, may
not redeem their bonds from GM if they wish to call their loan to
GM. Instead, the bondholder must either wait until the bond
matures to receive repayment of principal or sell the bond on the
market at its current market value, likely to be less than par. Bank
runs were associated with the failure of WaMu and Wachovia,33
and were prominently featured in the press following the FDIC's
closure of IndyMac,3j even though insured depositors' funds were
safe under the FDIC deposit insurance guarantee.
The FDIC expanded deposit insurance coverage even
further when it announced on October 14, 2008, not even two
weeks after EESA's passage, the creation of its Temporary
Liquidity Guaranty Program (TLGP).35 The TLGP provides
unlimited coverage to non-interest bearing transaction accounts
typically maintained by business customers (the Transaction
Account Guarantee Program) until December 31, 2009, and
provides FDIC guarantees for certain bank unsecured debt (the
32. H.R. 1424, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 136 (amending
12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) to increase the standard maximum deposit insurance
amount from $100,000 to $250,000).
33. See Rick Rothacker & Kerry Hall, Wachovia faced a 'silent' bankrun: Fearing
a loss of funding over the weekend the FDIC forced the sale, CHARLOrE OBSERVER,
Oct. 2, 2008, at 1A.
34. See Joe Adler, Success with Failures, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 2008, at 1 (stating
the "shower of news coverage [following IndyMac's failure] . . . panicked many
depositors ... not familiar with the ramifications of an FDIC takeover ... [leading to]
the first known bank run to occur after an institution had actually collapsed").
35. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity,
Creates New Program to Guarantee Bank Debt and Fully Insure Non-Interest
Bearing Deposit Transaction Accounts (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/2008/pr08100.html.
2009]
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Debt Guarantee Program) issued on or before June 30, 2009, with
the guarantee extending to either the earlier of the debt's maturity
or June 30, 2012.36
The FDIC cited the systemic risk exception as its authority
for the TLGP. The systemic risk exception, added to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act in 1991, permits FDIC assistance to a
troubled insured institution, including open bank assistance, even
when that is not the least costly method, if the institution's failure
would have "serious adverse effects on economic conditions or
financial stability."37 The systemic risk exception was invoked for
the first time when the FDIC was negotiating a loss sharing
arrangement with Citigroup as part of the possible purchase of
Wachovia 8
As a result of EESA's deposit insurance increase and the
TLGF's Transaction Account Guarantee Program, almost all bank
deposits may have the benefit of the FDIC's deposit insurance
guarantee. Slightly over 1000 insured institutions, however, have
opted out of the additional deposit insurance coverage for non-
interest bearing accounts.39 A much larger number of banks and
bank holding companies, 5,885, have opted out of the Debt
Guarantee Program, ° but many of these were smaller institutions
that rely on funding sources other than non-deposit debt.41 Thus,
most liabilities of insured financial institutions are, for at least a
temporary period of time, guaranteed by the federal government.
Moreover, according to the FDIC's final rule on the TLGP, the
FDIC's obligation under the Debt Guarantee Program is a full
faith and credit obligation of the United States to make a timely
36. Id.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2006).
38. See Joe Adler, Wachovia Deal Forces FDIC to use Systemic Tool, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 30, 2008, at 4. The Citigroup deal became moot when Wells Fargo
agreed to merge with Wachovia without FDIC assistance. See generally Frank A.
Hirsch, Jr. & Joseph S. Dowdy, Whither Wachovia? Wells Fargo Wins the Battle for
the Storied North Carolina Banking Institution, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 167 (2009).
39. FDIC, Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program Opt-Out Lists, http://www.
fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/optout.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2009) (there
were 1077 insured depository institutions as of Jan. 21, 2009).
40. Id.
41. See Jessica Holzer, Many Banks Opt out of FDIC Program, WALL ST. J., Dec.
3, 2008, at C2.
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payment of principal and interest on an uncured default in
payment of the debt. 2 The FDIC guarantee should allow banks
that have not opted out to borrow money at lower rates than
would be available without it.43  A number of institutions have
taken advantage of this boost to borrowing, including Citigroup
with its sale of $5.5 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.4
In late January 2009, the FDIC indicated that it was
considering proposing rule changes to the TLGP that would
extend the maturity of the debt guarantee from three to ten years
"where the debt is supported by collateral and the issuance
supports new consumer lending., 45 If adopted, the FDIC will then
provide guarantees of secured bank debt as well as unsecured
bank debt under the TLGP, providing deposit insurance
guarantees for virtually all of a bank's liabilities.
The FDIC's costs for the additional insurance and the debt
guarantees will be offset by the additional assessments insured
institutions must pay for the additional deposit insurance or FDIC
46guarantee. The FDIC also recently announced a doubling in its
base deposit insurance assessment rate.47
42. Final Rule, 73 FED. REG. 72244 (Nov. 26, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 370).
43. For instance, Deere & Co., a savings and loan holding company, issued $2
billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt through its credit arm at under three percent
interest, compared with yields of over five percent on other non-FDIC-guaranteed
Deere debt. See Liz Rappaport & Kellie Geressy, Deere Gets Backing in $2 Billion
Debt Offer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at C3.
44. Romy Varghese, Kellie Geressy & Matthew Cowley, H-P, Citi Debt Offerings
Bring in Billions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2008, at C2. See also Kellie Geressy, Investors
Buy $17.25 Billion in Banks' Bonds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2008, at C2.
45. Press Release, FDIC, Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC Provide
Assistance to Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009), at 5, http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
press/2009/pr09004.html. Banks wishing to take advantage of this ten-year guarantee
are likely to be required to apply before July 2009 and will probably be subject to the
TLGP caps on the aggregate outstanding debt that may be subject to the guarantee.
Rob Blackwell, Bair Looks to Put the 'a' Back in Tarp, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 2009, at
1.
46. See id. (12 C.F.R. § 370.6 for debt guarantee program assessments and § 330.7
for Transaction Account Guarantee Program assessments).
47. Final Rule, 73 FED. REG. 78155 (Dec. 22, 2008) (For the first quarter of 2009,
assessment rates for Category I banks will rise from five to seven cents per $100 of
deposits to twelve to fourteen cents.).
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IV. ASSET-BASED INITIATIVES: THE ASSET GUARANTEE
PROGRAM AND POTENTIAL ASSET PURCHASES
Although the expected use of TARP funds was to purchase
troubled assets from financial institutions, the only TARP funds
committed so far to assets are the asset pool guarantees provided
to Citigroup and Bank of America as part of the additional
preferred stock investments each institution received under the
TIP. The Treasury's guarantees are part of a new Asset Guarantee
Program (AGP). When the Treasury outlined this program in a
report to Congress on December 31, 2008, it stated that the AGP
"provides guarantees for assets held by systemically significant
financial institutions that face a high risk of losing market
confidence due in large part to a portfolio of distressed or illiquid
assets, and that "ilt is not anticipated that the program will be
made widely available., 49 The Treasury guarantees will be funded
under the TARP program. The FDIC joined in these guarantees,
but the FDIC guarantees will not be funded by TARP. Both the
FDIC and Treasury will receive compensation for the guarantees
in preferred stock and warrants of Citigroup and Bank of America.
In the case of Bank of America, a $118 billion pool of loans, and
other assets including securities backed by residential and
commercial real estate loans, will be subject to the guarantee.
Bank of America will be responsible for the first $10 billion in
losses on the pool, with additional losses covered twenty-five
percent by the FDIC up to a cap of $2.5 billion, and seventy-five
percent by the Treasury up to a cap of $7.5 billion.50  Ninety
percent of any losses beyond the first $20 billion will be covered by
a nonrecourse loan by the Federal Reserve 1.5  The Citigroup deal
presents even greater exposure for the Treasury and the FDIC.52
48. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 102 OF THE
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT 1, available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/eesa/congressionalreportsl02.shtml.
49. Id.
50. Press Release, FDIC, Explanation of FDIC's Loss Sharing Exposure (Jan. 16,
2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9OO4b.html. See also Rob
Blackwell, Bair Looks to Put the 'a' Back in Tarp, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 2009, at 1.
51. Id.
52. The Citigroup asset pool may be up to $306 billion in size. Citigroup is to
absorb the first $29 billion in losses. For losses in excess of that amount, ninety
[Vol. 13
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The assets guaranteed by the Treasury and the FDIC stay on the
books of the financial institutions. It is possible that additional
TARP funds may be used to fund other government loss sharing
on financial institution assets.53
FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair joined Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernacke in advocating the exploration of a "bad
bank" or "aggregator bank" funded in part by TARP that would
• • • 54
buy troubled assets from financial institutions, although the
Treasury still does not seem inclined to engage in asset purchases
15because of valuation difficulties and cost concerns.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF UNPRECEDENTED GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
The combined effect of these programs is a profound
government exposure to ensuring the funding of banks through
preferred stock purchases, the potential exercises of warrants to
purchase common stock, and the guarantees of virtually all bank
borrowings - from depositors, other unsecured creditors, and
potentially secured creditors. On the asset side, the government
has agreed to guarantee losses from specific asset pools for two
systemically significant institutions, Citigroup and Bank of
America, which could be extended to other institutions in some
form in 2009.
percent of the losses will be absorbed by the Treasury Department (up to the first $5
billion) under TARP and the then to the FDIC (up to $10 billion). The remaining
ten percent of the losses will be borne by Citigroup. Once the losses exceed the
amounts committed by the Treasury and the FDIC, the Federal Reserve will fund the
remaining pool of assets with a nonrecourse loan with Citigroup still responsible for
ten percent of the loss. Press Release, FDIC, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal
Reserve, and FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/cititermsheet_112308.pdf.
53. See Deborah Solomon & Damian Paletta, Treasury Plans More Expansive
Approach to Financial Rescue, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at A3.
54. See Rob Blackwell, Bair Looks to Put the 'a' Back in Tarp, AM. BANKER, Jan.
20, 2009, at 1. Chairman Bernacke stated in a speech on January 13, 2009: "Yet
another approach would be to set up and capitalize so-called bad banks, which would
purchase assets from financial institutions in exchange for cash and equity in the bad
bank." Ben S. Bernacke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Res. Sys., The Crisis and the Policy
Response (Jan. 13, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/speech/bernanke2009Oll3a.htm).
55. Solomon & Paletta, supra note 53.
2009]
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A. Equity
The purchase of preferred stock under the CPP program
for those financial institutions that applied and were approved
comes at a cost. The dividend due to the government is five
percent for the first five years, increasing to nine percent
thereafter. Furthermore, the preferred stock cannot be
repurchased from the government by the institution for the first
three years after its issuance. Preferred stock issued to Citigroup
and Bank of America pursuant to the TIP program for
systemically significant institutions is even more costly, carrying an
eight percent dividend. The cost of this source of funds is offset by
the lower cost funds that a bank may raise through insured
deposits and debt that carry the FDIC's guarantee. Banks must
then find lending opportunities that return more than their cost of
funds,56 but yet meet the safety and soundness requirements
expected by bank examiners. Thus, the cost of the preferred stock
purchases may induce risky lending behavior by banks rationally
seeking a high enough return on loans to offset the bank's cost of
funds, including the preferred stock dividend to be paid to the
government. At the same time, however, loan portfolios will be
scrupulously examined by bank regulators to ensure prudent
lending practices. The first implication of the extraordinary
government intervention is that the cost of the preferred stock and
the caution of bank examiners may result in a standoff in which
the new equity does not make its way into increased lending, as
was originally anticipated.
A second implication of the preferred stock purchases is
that the government has an increased interest in the success of the
institutions in which it has invested. The Treasury will not be paid
its dividend or be repaid its investment upon a repurchase of the
stock by the institution if the institution fails. The government's
financial stake in the institution could conceivably influence its
56. In the first week of January 2009, the average rate on a thirty-year home
mortgage loan was only 5.01%, declining in the week of January 15 to just 4.96%, and
rebounding the week of January 22 to 5.12%. See Freddie Mac, Weekly Primary
Mortgage Market Survey, http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/html/PMMS/display/PM
MSOutputYr.jsp (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
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decision to continue to provide assistance to the institution to
prevent the failure from wiping out its equity interest. This
incentive would presumably be greatest where the government has
the most to lose - the largest institutions in which its investment is
most significant, including Citigroup and Bank of America in
which the government has made additional targeted investments
under TIP because of the systemic significance of those
institutions. A further implication of the TIP limitation of
dividends on common stock to one cent per share for three years is
that the attractiveness of the common stock has been reduced for
private shareholders, possibly making it harder for these two
institutions to attract new, private capital during this critical
period.
An interesting by-product of this unprecedented
government effort to shore up the ability of banks and their
holding companies to borrow and raise capital is the exploding
popularity of bank holding companies. The FRB approved the
applications of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, American
Express, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC),
among others, to become bank holding companies,
notwithstanding the Bank Holding Company Act's (BHCA)
limitations on mixing banking and commerce. Until this financial
crisis, all of these institutions assiduously avoided characterization
as a bank holding company because of the limitations that
designation places on nonbanking and nonfinancial activities of
the holding company and because of the desire to avoid the
additional regulation and oversight imposed by the FRB under the
BHCA. The capital infusions through CPP, increased deposit
insurance and government guarantees, and the public perception
that institutions subject to FRB oversight are safer and sounder
than less regulated entities, however, have made the bank holding
company status quite popular. It remains to be seen what long-
term implications these holding companies will present for the
continued separation of banking from other commercial
enterprises, and whether these firms will gain an unfair advantage
over their competitors who have not elected or cannot qualify for
bank holding company status.
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B. Liabilities
In EESA, Congress provided for a temporary boost in the
standard deposit insurance amount. The FDIC followed less than
two weeks later with an unlimited expansion of deposit insurance
for non-interest bearing transaction accounts and for FDIC
guarantees of unsecured bank debt, all pursuant to the systemic
risk exception added to the FDIC Act in 1991. The use of that
authority has not been challenged, but it could be argued that it
was meant to apply only to FDIC aid aimed at a particular
institution rather than to potentially all financial institutions.
Moreover, does the voluntary nature of the participation in both
the Transaction Account Guarantee Program and the Debt
Guarantee Program undercut the conclusion that not offering
these programs would result in "serious adverse effects on
economic conditions or financial stability?"57
Normally, increases in deposit insurance and government
guarantees would be met with concerns about the increase in
moral hazard. With the FDIC agreeing to insure depositors and
guarantee unsecured credits, depositor and creditor discipline of
the risk-taking behavior of banks is diminished, increasing the
potential moral hazard of bank lending practices. One obvious
check on bank risk-taking is the bank supervision and examination
process. Examiners have been especially critical of bank credit
quality during this time. Another check on risk-taking may be that
banks' cost of funds from insured depositors and FDIC-
guaranteed creditors should be close to a risk-free rate," perhaps
permitting a sufficient interest rate spread without making an
excessively risky loan. Banks according to some, however, have
been too reluctant to lend and are hoarding their funds, including
those funds provided by government preferred stock purchases, to
build war chests to take advantage of strategic acquisition
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2006).
58. Deere & Co., a savings and loan holding company, issued $2 billion of FDIC-
guaranteed debt through its credit arm at less than three percent, compared with over
five percent yields on other non-FDIC-guaranteed Deere debt. Three percent may
not be a risk-free rate, but it is certainly less than the interest rate demanded by
Deere creditors who do not benefit from the guarantee. See Rappaport & Geressy,
supra note 43.
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opportunities. For the TLGP to achieve its purpose of "favorably
impact[ing] both the availability and the cost of credit,"59 bankers
and bank examiners will have to find the proper balance between
increasing credit while maintaining prudent underwriting
standards and an adequate capital cushion.
Another interesting implication of the Debt Guarantee
Program is that the FDIC's final rule on the TGLF proclaims that
it is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States
government. 6° Whether that statement is sufficient to bind the
government should FDIC reserves be insufficient, will hopefully
never be tested. But, if the statement is true, this puts banks'
unsecured creditors in a theoretically better position than insured
bank depositors. Bank depositors will be paid from the FDIC's
reserves. Should those reserves run out, Congress would no doubt
appropriate more money to honor the FDIC deposit insurance
guarantee, but there is no requirement that it do So.
The possibility of depleting FDIC reserves is, of course,
one of the reasons this extraordinary government intervention is
taking place - to keep banks from failing and imposing costs on
the FDIC. The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2006
requires that the FDIC maintain reserves that equal at least 1.15%
62
of insured deposits. Although reserves were at 1.19% at the end
of the first quarter of 2008, they have steadily declined since then -
to 1.01% at the end of the second quarter and 0.76% at the end of
the third quarter. Even with projected increased premiums, the
FDIC estimates the reserves could be at 0.63% by the end of the
first quarter in 2009.63 By statute, the FDIC has five years to
return the ratio to the 1.15% minimum.64 At the same time, the
FDIC's costs are increasing as it adds additional personnel to deal
with the current failed institutions and to monitor the 171
59. Final Rule, 73 FED. REG. 72244, 72244 (Nov. 26, 2008).
60. Id.
61. See Rob Blackwell & Joe Adler, Industry Backs Giving FDIC More Power,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 3, 2009, at 1 (describing proposed legislation to more than triple
the FDIC's borrowing authority from the Treasury to $100 billion).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3) (2006).
63. See Joe Adler, As Failures Multiply, So Does FDIC '09 Budget, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 17, 2008, at 1.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3) (2006).
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institutions that remain on its troubled bank list." The FDIC
assessments for the Deposit Account Guarantee Program and the
Debt Guarantee Program will help replenish the FDIC coffers. In
addition, the FDIC recently increased its assessment rates for its
basic deposit insurance coverage, effectively doubling the deposit
insurance expense for the healthiest banks from five to seven cents
per $100 of deposits to twelve to fourteen cents.66 Thus, a serious
implication of the government's intervention into bank balance
sheets is the effect on the FDIC reserves, and whether the
solvency of the FDIC could itself be at risk.
How will banks cope with the increased costs associated
with this extraordinary government aid through preferred stock
dividend payments to the government, a doubling of the base
deposit insurance assessment, and additional assessments for those
institutions participating in the Transaction Account Guarantee
Program or the Debt Guarantee Program? It is likely that one
implication is that banks will be forced to consolidate. Those that
need additional capital will seek out those with excess capital.
Combining banks may allow the surviving institution to
significantly reduce personnel costs by layoffs of employees
performing redundant functions, but creating further economic
implications for the families so affected.
C. Assets
The Asset Guarantee Program (AGP) for the systemically
significant institutions, Citigroup and Bank of America, is funded
out of TARP. The FDIC's associated guarantee, however, is not
TARP funded. It is not clear whether the FDIC's guarantee is
backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government or the
FDIC's reserve fund. Given the significant strains currently
existing on the FDIC reserve fund, this is a significant issue which
will hopefully be clarified in the coming months. It may be
inappropriate for the FDIC's insurance fund to be at risk for the
amount of the FDIC guarantee since assessments for the
65. See Joe Adler, Success with Failures, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 2008, at 1.
66. Final Rule, 73 FED. REG. 78155 (Dec. 22, 2008).
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guarantee will not be added to the reserve fund. The payment for
the guarantee is more preferred stock and common stock warrants,
which will only have value if the issuing institutions return to
health and prosperity.
One consequence of continuing to avoid bad asset
purchases by an external entity funded by the government, private
entities, or some combination of the two, is that financial
institutions may be unable to attract private capital with the bad
assets continuing to bloody their balance sheets, becoming wholly
dependent on government equity.
D. Nationalization of Systemically Significant Institutions
A final implication is that the two institutions so far
identified as systemically significant and needing government aid
have been effectively nationalized. In this case, it seems clear that
the term "systemically significant" institutions is a thinly veiled
code-name for institutions that are "too big to fail." The preferred
stock purchased by the government or given to the Treasury or the
FDIC in exchange for the guarantees of the asset pools equals over
one-third of Citigroup's stockholder's equity and one-fifth of Bank
of America's consolidated equity following its merger with Merrill
Lynch. The Treasury and the FDIC have collectively guaranteed
another $12.5 billion to each institution should the losses on the
asset pools subject to the guarantee exceed the amount of the
institution's first loss position. The government is by far the
largest equity holder of each of these institutions.
Government Assistance Citigroup Bank of
(in billions) America
TARP
-Capital Purchase Program (CPP) $25 $25
-Targeted Investment Program (TIP) 20 20
Asset Guarantee Program 4 3
For preferred stock
Treasury total preferred stock $49 $48
FDIC Asset Guarantee 3 1
For preferred stock
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Total Treasury and FDIC preferred $52 $49
stock
TARP - Asset Guarantee Program 5 10
(AGP)
Max. guarantee on asset pool
FDIC 7.5 2.5
Max. guarantee on asset pool
Total Treasury and FDIC exposure $12.5 $12.5
on asset pools
Stockholders' Equity as of 12/31/08 $150.8 $236.167
Total Treasury and FDIC preferred 34.5% 22.7%
stock/Stockholders' Equity
VI. CONCLUSION
As it stands, the liability and equity side of bank balance
sheets are being significantly impacted by government efforts to
infuse capital through preferred stock purchases under the CPP
(which carry warrants for the government to buy common stock in
the banks) and insurance and guarantees which lower the cost of
borrowing to fund the bank's operations under the TLGP. An
expansion of the TLGP will provide even longer term bank debt
guarantees if the bank can collateralize the guarantee with certain
recently originated consumer loans. Whether and how long it will
take to wean banks from these government subsidies when the
economy and financial system return to health remains to be seen.
The Treasury is likely the largest single equity holder of
many of the institutions which have qualified for and accepted
CPP funds. Does this ownership stake affect the government's
decisions about whether to let these institutions fail?
Notwithstanding its extensive interest, can the government
effectively protect its investment with nonvoting preferred stock?
What additional conditions is the government likely to impose on
the institutions that have accepted CPP money? Will financial
67. This number includes the $20 billion in preferred stock committed to Bank of
America on January 16, 2009, which has been added to Bank of America's 2008 year-
end stockholders' equity.
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institutions be able to pay the preferred stock dividends to the
Treasury and the increased deposit insurance assessments to the
FDIC, without failing or compromising the safety and soundness
of the institution?
Since October 3, 2008, the government has made
extraordinary interventions to bolster bank balance sheets and
avoid bank failures. Whether these efforts are successful in
avoiding widespread bank failure, it is clear that they have
dramatically changed the relationship between banks and the
government for the foreseeable future.

